Julie Sirrs was an Afghan analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1995-1999. She is currently a consultant focusing on Afghanistan and the surrounding region. She has made four trips to Afghanistan in recent years, one of which involved filming the documentary "Abandon All Hope, Welcome to Afghanistan," which was shown on MSNBC.

The Central Intelligence Agency recently released an assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan which predicted that, in the words of one official who read it, "there is a medium-term potential for the renewal of civil conflict."¹ But that analysis reveals relatively little, since Afghanistan has been plagued by one form of internal strife or another for most of the last two centuries. To fully understand the challenges that lie ahead for Afghanistan, it is more helpful to examine the various factors which could lead to instability in the country.

Internal Factors

The Afghan central government, headed by Chairman Hamid Karzai, has already passed several crucial tests. Since taking the oath of his new office on December 23, Karzai has already reinstated Afghanistan's 1964 constitution (minus the provisions which declared the country's form of government as a monarchy) and presided over the UN-sponsored nomination of a twenty-one person commission responsible for convening a loya jirga (grand council) in June to select an interim government for the following eighteen months. For the first time since the Taliban took power, females will join males throughout the country in resuming their education with the start of the new school term in March. Perhaps most importantly, Karzai has managed to successfully serve as a bridge between the two main groups in his administration: the Northern Alliance faction which militarily resisted the Taliban, and the exiles surrounding Afghanistan's former king, Zahir Shah, based in Rome. Though Karzai was affiliated with the Rome group, his candidacy for the chairmanship was supported by the Northern Alliance.

The most delicate test to date of Karzai's balancing act within the government was the mid-February murder of Minister for Civil Aviation Abdul Rahman, a member of the King's faction who was formerly with the Northern Alliance. Rahman was beaten to death at Kabul airport by an angry mob of hajjis (pilgrims) waiting to depart on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Karzai's initial statements that Rahman's killing was part of a plot by Northern Alliance-affiliated officials appear to have been made in haste, presumably under pressure from those within the royalist faction. It now appears that, while the crowd may well have been incited by remarks made by these officials who were among the stranded hajjis, it was not a premeditated assassination.² What is somewhat heartening about the episode, however, is that even the key Northern Alliance figures in the government did not immediately contradict Karzai's assertions, but cooperated in turning over their fellow faction members, realizing the importance of maintaining the government's unity.

Another important test which Karzai passed - reflecting both his own skills at achieving consensus and the determination of all involved to remain unified, involved the governorship of the southern province of Paktia. This dispute started when the man who had been serving as that province's governor refused to step down in favor of a candidate newly appointed by the central government. Several weeks of fighting ensued before Karzai managed to subdue the crisis by calling representatives of the contending parties to the capital. Eventually they agreed on a new candidate acceptable to all, Taj Mohammed Wardak, an octogenarian pulled from exile in California, but who also has support within Paktia.

Similarly, tensions which had been brewing between the powerful governor of Herat province, Ismail Khan, and Kandahar's governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, also seem to have subsided, at least for now. Again, communication and compromise appear to have succeeded in place of resorting to arms. Khan defused the situation by meeting with a delegation from Kandahar and addressing their concerns, which chiefly involved the imprisonment of several hundred Kandaharis accused by Khan of being former Taliban members (the Kandaharis claimed that they were ordinary businessmen). The two sides formed a committee to investigate the matter, putting the confrontation on hold temporarily.

Yet it would be inaccurate to paint an entirely rosy picture of Afghanistan under the new interim government. Occasional, albeit vague, references to crime having increased appear in press reports, though nothing on the scale of the Taliban's marauding at its worst. Local chieftains are also waging power struggles in various parts of the country, prompting Kabul to request an expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to other cities to strengthen the central government's hold on power. The most serious of these rivalries is in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, where ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum has returned to prominence, thanks to his connections with American forces and the government of Uzbekistan, despite having only recently returned to Mazar after fleeing the Taliban.

Dostum's renewed stature has come at the expense of Commander Atta, a Tajik who had remained in the area leading the resistance against the Taliban. Fueling Dostum's unpopularity are reports that his men have committed a number of atrocities in camps of displaced people near Mazar. Nevertheless, he is likely considered more attractive to backers in Washington and Tashkent because his prolonged absence from Afghanistan meant that he established few ties with the Iranians who were the chief sponsors of the resistance prior to September 11. Despite their dispute, however, both Dostum and Atta remain at least nominally loyal to the Kabul administration. Dostum is a deputy defense minister while Atta is closely linked with the Northern Alliance faction which dominates key positions in the central government. The decisive factor in their power struggle may well be the Shi'ite Hazaras in Mazar-e Sharif. Traditionally, they have maintained closer political ties with Dostum, and they also have a longer-standing relationship with Iran than does Atta, a Sunni.

External Factors

At least as challenging for the new government in Kabul as establishing peace within Afghanistan's borders will be maintaining harmony with its neighbors and international supporters. The relationship with Pakistan has the most potential for tension, given Islamabad's past sponsorship of the Taliban. Karzai attempted to put this past history at least superficially to rest when he visited Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in early February. The Afghan leader stated that "past misunderstandings and misperceptions" between the two countries have been "buried."³ Shortly thereafter, however, Interior Minister Yunis Qanuni accused Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI, of maintaining contact with former Taliban officials who remain at large and helping to shelter Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Ladin.⁴ American officials have admitted that bin Ladin most likely escaped to Pakistan, though Washington is evidently unwilling to scour that country for the ex-Saudi fugitive to the same degree that it has Afghanistan.⁵

Meanwhile, Taliban officials such as former interior minister Abdul Razzaq, who is believed to be sheltering near the Pakistani border in the town of Spin Boldak, and former Taliban finance minister Abdul Kabir have vowed to return to fight in the coming spring. Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah recently warned that the Taliban are reorganizing, noting that the militia's remnants have formed two parties in Pakistan.⁶ Furthermore, Haji Zaman, who is involved in fomenting unrest in the eastern province of Jalalabad, is widely believed to be backed by Islamabad. The recent surrender of Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil has also sparked speculation and concern that the former Taliban foreign minister, portrayed as a moderate by the militia's supporters in Islamabad, may be positioning himself for a role in a future Afghan government.

As a result, Karzai and others in his administration who favor the expansion of international peace keepers throughout the country likely do so not only to ensure their own authority, but also to prevent other countries from exerting undue influence. In this latter category with Pakistan should also be included Iran, though this threat is one which seems to be of far greater concern to American than Afghan officials. Indeed, Karzai paid a cordial visit to Iran in late February, and UN officials dealing with Afghanistan have said that Tehran is not actively destabilizing the government there.⁷ But significant Iranian influence cannot be denied; after all, it was Tehran which forged strong ties with many in the Northern Alliance during the period of resistance to the Taliban, when Iran was the only country to significantly aid their efforts. This assistance was generally delivered through Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its intelligence ministry. These operatives have remained in the country to collect information, particularly on the expanding US military presence, and have reportedly been encountered by American special forces.

Iran also helped to solidify ties in the past by providing refuge to a number of anti-Taliban Afghans and their families, such as Herat governor Ismail Khan. Yet Khan - in response to criticism that Tehran is backing him to the detriment of the Kabul government - has also been quick to note that he has turned down some Iranian offers, such as a free television broadcast system which would have required that Iran be allowed to determine at least some of the programming. Furthermore, Khan has complained that Tehran was not always as helpful to him as he would have wished in the past. For instance, Iran generally did not allow the Afghan resistance to launch operations against the Taliban directly from Iranian soil, thus necessitating a long and arduous journey overland from northeastern Afghanistan when Khan and his men returned to the western province of Herat.⁸

For its part, Iran also appears sensitive to recent US charges against its role in Afghanistan. Tehran has closed the office of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a one-time Pakistani favorite currently in exile in Tehran, for criticizing the Karzai government. Iran has also denied American accusations that it has abetted the escape of Al-Qa'ida members fleeing Afghanistan. Though a criminal people-smuggling network does run through Iran, official support to the bin Ladin fugitives would be an abrupt policy change after Tehran's years-long support of the Northern Alliance forces fighting against Al-Qa'ida. Indeed, Iran may well have cause to doubt the sincerity of US concerns about bin Ladin's men, since Washington has not publicly lodged similar criticism against Pakistan for airlifting a number of Al-Qa'ida fighters from Konduz last autumn. On the contrary, Pakistan has deftly managed to turn American suspicions regarding Iran to its advantage, promoting itself as a counterweight to Tehran's influence in Afghanistan. It was this same argument that contributed to early American acceptance of the Taliban, which was portrayed by Islamabad as a Sunni Muslim bulwark against Iran's revolutionary Shi'ite ideology.

While Iranian involvement in terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere is not in dispute, its aims in Afghanistan in recent years have generally been benign, even helpful, to US interests in the country. High-level officials in the State Department have praised Iran not only for its assistance to the anti-Taliban resistance, but also for playing a positive role in creating the current interim government. An inherent check to Iran's power within Afghanistan is that it has traditionally wielded the most influence among the Shi'ites, who comprise only about 15% of the total population. Tehran's significant ties among some of the country's Sunnis are only relatively recent, dating to the Taliban's first dramatic territorial gains in mid-1995. These same Sunnis, however, such as Foreign Minister Abdullah, Defense Minister Fahim, and Interior Minister Qanuni, are generally considered the most pro-Western since they are embittered by much of the Islamic world's abandonment - and even hostility - during their fight against the Taliban. Perhaps most significant of all, the Afghans likely realize that the money they desperately need for reconstruction cannot be supplied by Iran, but by the West, particularly the United States. Thus, while they are unlikely to forget past assistance and become hostile to Iran, they are also very unlikely to blindly do Tehran's bidding, especially were it to come at the expense of their new found ties with Washington.

Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by Karzai and his government is gaining access to sufficient funds, not only to rebuild the country, but also to enhance the power of the central authority and preserve stability. Although the international community has pledged $4.5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan, most of these funds have yet to arrive. Although this aid may have long term negative repercussions (as the examples of Bosnia and the Palestinian Authority illustrate, a massive influx of foreign aid can fuel rampant government corruption), for the time being it is a necessity - the World Bank estimates that the country will be unable to generate its own revenue for at least the next two years.

Without a significant and rapid inflow of capital, the central government will not only be hard-pressed to pay its own employees, but will be incapable of improving the law and order situation. Though a nascent civilian police force is in place in Kabul, its efforts remain hindered by a lack of supplies. In the long term, the key to maintaining stability across the country will be the speed at which a national army can be formed, a task with which the US has promised to help. Until then, however, Kabul will have difficulty extending its writ during the several months to several years that will be required to form this national force. And while the additional international peace keepers it has requested would help fill this gap, their enlarged mandate remains uncertain since Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has openly stated his objections to such a plan.⁹ Yet without these international soldiers, American forces may become increasingly drawn directly into factional fighting, with all of the pitfalls - from US casualties to mistakes involving collateral damage - these operations entail.

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Julie Sirrs, What's Next for Afghanistan?, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, November 2001.

Notes

  ¹ Michael Gordon, "CIA Warns That Afghan Factions May Bring Chaos." New York Times, 21 February 2002.
  ² The extent of their guilt appears to be that they likely told the increasingly agitated crowd of the reasons for Rahman's ouster from the Northern Alliance, which involved the aviation minister's personal and professional corruption, including using the national airline for his personal errands. The pilgrims, who had been waiting for two days in freezing weather due to a shortage of planes (several of them died), became genuinely incensed when Rahman attempted to fly to India. After surrounding the aircraft, the crowd pulled Rahman from it and killed him. Rahman's poor planning in dealing with the stranded hajjis had played such a crucial role in his ultimate demise that it is unlikely the entire event could have been plotted in advance. To what degree the officials at the airport are culpable - both those within the crowd and those who were unable or unwilling to come to Rahman's aid - remains to be fully determined.
  ³ Douglas Jehl, "Afghan and Pakistani Leaders Pledge to Move Beyond Old Grudges," New York Times, 9 February 2002.
  ⁴ Douglas Jehl, "Afghan Official Says Pakistanis Helped bin Ladin Evade Capture," New York Times, 13 February 2002.
  ⁵ Jennifer Harper, "Bin Ladin Stories Raise CIA Hackles," Washington Times, 17 January 2002.
  ⁶ Peter Baker, "Taliban Reorganizing, Afghan Official Warns," Washington Post, 10 February 2002.
  ⁷ Reuters, 24 January 2002.
  ⁸ Guy Chazan, "Emir of Herat Is Too Neighborly For Some," The Wall Street Journal, 23 January 2002.
  ⁹ Michael Gordon, "CIA Warns that Afghan Factions May Bring Chaos," New York Times, 21 February 2002.